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"No  man  qualifies as  a  statesman who  is entirely ignorant 
of the  problems of wheat" 
- Socrates 
I  am  most grateful to  you,  r-1r.  Chairman,  and  to the 
Washington Association of Wheat  Growers  for  giving me  this 
opportunity to visit Spokane  once  again -1rhis is the  2nd 
occasion in less than  6  months  - we  shall  - as  they  ~ay -
have  to  stop meeting like this.  And  of course  for  the 
chance of attempting briefly to explain to  you  the  European 
Community's  cereal marketing arrangements  - particularly 
as they affect wheat.  To  do  this adequately  I  would  need 
a  little longer  than this half hour or so. 
As  most of you will know,  the  European  Community 
has operated its mvn  farm  policy  - the  Common  Agricultural 
Policy or CAP  - for  the last 20  years or  so  and  I  imagine  that 
you will also appreciate its importance not only  to our  3 
million farmers  but also  to all 270  million Europeans  living 
in our  10  !-!ember  States. 
The  objectives of the  CAP  can be  summarised  as  follows 
to  increase productivity 
to  give  the  farmer  a  fair standard of living 
to assure  the  supply of sufficient food at reasonable 
prices and 
to stabilise markets. - 2  -
These  goals  are not very different  from  those of 
US  farm policy.  All  the  goals  I  mentioned have  equal  im-
portance but the last - market stability - has,  I  suppose  -
the greatest relevance  to our subject this morning. 
Broadly,  these objectives are achieved by  fixing 
common  prices  for  the major part of our  farm  production. 
Then,  to maintain internal price stability,  variable  .. levies 
are applied to  imports when  world market prices  ~below 
our internal price level.  Refunds  are also paid on  exports 
to bring our prices  to  a  level at which  they can  compete  on 
the world market.  ~~hen our internal price is below that on 
the world market
1
as  happened  in the mid  70's  - an  export  tax 
or levy is applied  - in order to maintain stability on  and 
prevent disruption of the  EC  market. 
But  let us  examine  in more detail the specific 
arrangements  for  grains. 
The  Community's  grain market  regime  was  originally 
set up  in 1962  when  legislation was  enacted which ·set out 
the objectives of  a  common  market  inCereals  and  laid down 
the outlines of the  system and  the rules  for  both internal 
1'\..(. 
exchanges  bet.-..veen~ original members  and with third countries. 
Since there were  wide differences  between national 
price levels at that time 1levies were  applied on  intra Community 
Ju. 
trade but with the objective that these would  graduallyhreduced 
~~  ~·e.-t.... 
over  a  five  year transition period  ~[common internal prices 
and  a  minimum  threshold price would  be  established. - 3  -
You  can  imagine  that there were  some  tough negotiations 
over the levels at which  the  common  prices  should be set. 
With  the benefit of hindsight,perhaps  we  would  have  been wiser 
to  have  set them at the  lower  French  and  Belgian levels rather 
than at the higher  German  and  Luxembourg  levels. 
In  any  event,  intra Community  levies were  finally abo-
lished and  common  support prices  adopted  on  1  July 1967. 
The  relevant regulation provided that a  common  market 
system would  cover all the main  grains whether  grown  in or 
imported  into the  Community,  that is 
- common  wheat 
rye 
barley 
oats 
maize  (corn) 
sorghum  (milo) 
durum wheat 
a  number of other minor  grains 
wheat  and  rye  flour  and  meal. 
This original  1967  regulation has  been  superseded by 
subsequent legislation but the basic principles  and  mechanism 
remain  unchanged.  Let  me  describe  them. 
It provides  for  the annual  fixing of the  following 
common  prices 
the  intervention price 
reference price 
target price 
tllrasholll  t~rice ----·---·---
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These  prices  are the  same  - in ECU  terms  - throughout 
the  Community  •  Thus  the  expression Common  Prices. 
On  the basis of proposals made  to  them by  the 
Commission of the  European  Communities  - the  Council of 
Ministers  (national Ministers)  annually  fixes  the target and 
intervention prices  for  the main  grains  and  the reference price 
for  bread-making \vheat.  These  prices  apply to  a  staadard 
quality of grain throughout the  Community.  The  threshold 
price is established later by  the Commission.  A  [(  Lf  p--r'·c..e.s 
~~  ~  ~ ~  x...£P<.  ~lt...~ 4  ~~~  ~t  h. ~ 
The  intervention price is the basis  for  supporting 
our  internal market when  supplies  exceed  demand  and  applies 
to barley,  feed wheat,  rye,  maize  and  durum wheat.  Wheat  of 
bread making quality is treated rather differently in that 
it enjoys  a  special reference price.  I  will return to that 
later. 
The  intervention price is the delivered to store 
price at which national authorities are obliged to  buy  grain 
of  a  minimum quality and quantity,offered to  them by  a  farmer 
-~~h~.n.. 
or trader.  It serves  as  a  last resortland puts  a  floor  in 
the market.  Prices at the  farm  gate,  however,  are  frequently 
below intervention  le~els at times  of surplus since allowances 
have  to  be  made  for  transport,  handling  and  the risk that the 
grain might  not meet  the  standard. -----------~----------------~-----------
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Intervention for wheat is mandatory  - that is to  say  -
that anyone  can sell his  grain to the  intervention agency at 
any  time provided that it meets  the prescribed standards. 
In offering  '-his  wheat  to  the national intervention agency, 
~v....e...,.._~(T\.... 
the seller specifies at which  of the three nearestlcentres 
he  is prepared to deliver.  The  seller has  to bear the cost 
of transport to  the centre  he  has 
specified since the  agency  may  indicate  a  different ene. 
In this case  the price to be  paid is adjusted to take account 
of any difference in transport costs  between  the  two  centres. 
The  price paid to  the seller is that for  the month 
of delivery
1provided it is not  lower  than  the intervention price 
obtaining in the  month of the offer - in this case  the  higher 
price obtains.  Payment is usually  made  within  a  few  weeks. 
As  I  said earlier,  the  intervention price  for wheat 
~·~--~;j 
relates to  a  standard qu~y  and  the actual price paid to 
the  farmer  is adjusted  for  variations  from  this  standard  -
tJ'. ~  .f-3'\.  ~·$~ ~  Lr;:;:.e, ~ 
~r  excess moisture  for  example.  Lf  wheat  does  not meet  the 
m1nimum  quality~' it is rejected.  ~'  ~  ~ 
#{( ~  h  s.e..t{ ~  6[  ~~·'-\ d?vt·  a.  t:rv-'c..e.  ~ 
~  Much  of the wheat  produced  in the  Conununity  is not 
of bread making quality but  for  that which  is a  special 
"reference"  price or super  intervention price is fixed, 
which  reflects the  fact that these  types  of \vheat  have  lower 
yields  than  feed  wheats.  To  qualify for  this higher re-
~~v 
~ 
~ 
l~ 
~·~~ 
~s..,.ec 
a--1~, 
~~ 
c 4"2'"--1-$ 
.!-o 
l~,~ - 6  -
ference  price the wheat must pass  special tests to determine 
its suitability for  bread making. 
But let me  return to the other institutional prices 
which  are  fixed  each year  and describe their relationship with 
the  intervention price. 
First,  the target price. 
This  represents  the desired price  for  our wheat producers  and 
is intended to reflect the delivery price at Duisburg in 
West  Germany  which1since it is situated in the centre of  a 
highly industrialised area,  supposedly represents  the point ot 
maximum deficit in the  Community. 
This  target price is derived  from  the intervention 
price at Ormes  in the  Paris basin  - the bread basket of the 
Cormnuni ty  - and  to which is added 
a  "market"  element \vhich  takes  account of  the 
difference  bet'tveen  the market  price  and  intervention price 
expected as at Ormesin  a  normal  year. 
- and  second,  the cost of transporting wheat  from  Ormes 
to  Duisburg. 
As  a  result,  in most  regions of the  Community,  market 
prices  should  normally  be  between  the Ormes  level  - that is 
intervention,  plus  the market  elernent
1 
and the Duisburg or 
target price. - 7  -
I  fear that  I  now  have  to burden  you with yet another 
element in this concept  - that of  the  threshold price. 
A  threshold price is set not only  for  the main 
grains  (wheat,  barley,  maize etc.)  but also  for  the less 
important ones  and it is fixed at such  a  level that ~ 
imported wheat,  for  instance,  will be  sold in Duisburg  - yes 
Duisburg once  again  - at the target price set for internally 
~ 
produced wheat.  The  threshold price is thus  arrived~y 
taking the target price and  subtracting the cost of shipping 
the grain by  the cheapest means  from  Rotterdam  to·  Duisburg. 
Its purpose is to  ensure that the  target price is not  undercut 
and  in order to achieve this) variable  levies are charged on 
imports.  The  levy is set daily by  the Commission  and  is equal 
to  the difference between  the  threshold price  and  the  lowest 
cif price available at a  Community  port. 
So  to  resume,  we  have  an  intervention price  - the 
floor to the market,  a  target price  - the desirable internal 
price level  and  a  threshold price calculated in  such way  that the 
target price is not  undercut.  ~vithin this  framework,  grain is 
freely bought  and  sold by private traders on  the  open  market 
within the  10  Hember  States. 
Once  wheat,  for  instance,  has  been offered and  bought 
into intervention by national authorities, it can only be  sold 
on  to the internal market when  there is no  danger of depressing 
prices.  It is normally sold by  tender. - 8  -
Perhaps  I  could  now  say  a  word  about the way  in 
which our cereals export policy is operated.  This  is,  I 
imagine,  not without interest to you  since as  I  was  told 
only the other day  - "the CAP  is fine  so  long as it confines 
itself to domestic,  internal policies but not  so  good  when 
you  export your  surplus  by  means  of unfair export  subsidies". 
Just two  general points.  First,  we  are not the 
only wheat  producers  in the world  that export their surpluses. 
~  ~  ~vo thirds of  US  wheat,  for  example,  is surplus  to require-
~ 
ments  and  has  to  find buyers  on  the external market.  And 
second,  international trading rules  specifically permit the  use 
of export subsidies,  provided  they  are not used  to  gain  more 
than  an  equitable share of the market.  I  will return to this 
point in  a  moment,  but  to  the  nuts  and bolts of  the  operation 
itself. 
The  Commission  has  a  fair amount of discretion over 
the  way it operates the Community's  export policy but within 
a  strict framework  set out in legislation 
The  major  considerations  taken  into account are  the 
Community's  supply situationJthe need  to a¥oid violent price 
fluctuations  on  the  internal market,  the prices ruling on 
export markets  and  budgeting constraints. - 9  -
The  purpose of any  export refund  fixed  by  the 
Commission  is to bridge the  gap  between  the normally 
relatively high price available inside the  Community  and 
the  lower price on  a  specific export market.  It is not 
used  to  undercut third market prices  since this would  be 
contrary to  GATT  international trading rules  and  seond 
would  be  a  waste  of money. 
Export refunds,  whichJmore  often than notJare  fixed 
by  tender,  vary  in their amount  depending on  the country  -
or zone  of destination.  If the  tenders  submitted are 
excessive as  to  the  level of  refund requested,  then  they 
are  turned  down.  Export  refunds  to most  destinations  in 
the world  are  far  from  being the  usual state of affairs  -
as  is often believed.  In  fact,  it is not infrequent to 
for  us  to have  refunds  for  only  one  or  two  destinations 
or even  for  none  at all. 
Well,  so  much  for  the  legislative requirements.  You 
will,  I  imagine,  be  interested in the practical effect of 
all this. 
First,  the effect of the  support prices  I  have  just 
described.  We  are  frequently  accused of  spending limitless 
sums  of money  to  encourage our  farmers  to produce  surpluses 
which  are  then off-loaded onto  world  markets  with the aid 
of unfair export subsidies. 
s - 10  -
mag 
a  t. 
~  Let  us  examine  the  facts. 
First,  as  a  result of the support we  give our 
farmers,  our wheat production,  for  example,  has  increased 
by  29  % over the last 10  years  - slightly more  than  the 
world  average of  27  %.  The  increase here has  been  73  % 
or  2  1/2  times  the world average.  I  say this in no  accusa-
'  tory sense but in an  attempt to set the  record straight. 
t~ ~  +;·~ 1: ~  ~  ~  ~  :~ ""  .. ~  (~  ~ 
Furthermore,  the  increase in Community production has  been 
,.,.v..-~ 
achieved on  an  acreage  that has  remained virtually un-
ch~n~~~ for  the last ten years or more~ 
~r. 
~ 
~~ 
~ 
~~ 
pU.4~ 
~  ~  mentioned earlier the  GATT  r®&Qlts  on  in  tern  a tional  ~.; 
V'- l{4 
trading which  permit export subsidies  on  agricultural products 
provided that they  are not used to gain more  than  an  equitable 
share of  the market. 
Let  us  examine  for  a  moment  what has  actually happened 
w},lith  wheat  and wheat  flour.  Our  share of the world market 
increased over  the last decade  from  10  % to  14  %.  The  US 
share  from  34  % to  46  %.  I  do  not think that any  reasonable 
person would  conclude  from  this that we  had  acted unfairly  -
or against the rules. 
It seems  to  me  that where  you  have  lost markets  for 
wheat  - or indeed  for  other agricultural products,  the major 
factor has  been the strength of  the  US  dollar.  This is not - 11  -
a  particularly original diagnosis.  But in support of it 
I  should  just like to offer you  a  telling example  which was 
provided recently  by  a  former  Under  Secretary at USDA. 
If you  look at the price of wheat  in mid  August  1980 
and  mid  August  1983  you will find that it was  almost exactly 
~  ~((_,_...~~ 
the  same~n both dates  - 3.34  $  per bushel  in 1980  and 
3. 30  $  in--1983.  But to have  paid  for  that same  bushel  in 
German  DM,  for  example,  would  have  cost you  5.97  in 1980 
and  9.11  DM  in 1983. 
From  the point of view of  a  competitor the contrast 
is equally striking.  In August  1980,  the  US  price converted 
into Australian dollars would  have  been  2.89  Australian  and 
in  1983  3.82  Australian.  In other words,  the Australian 
farmer  would  have  received nearly  1  $  more  in Australian 
currency or  ~he could have  dropped  his price by  a  cent or 
twoJto  undercut the  US  priceJand still have  made  comfortably 
more  than  in 1980. -----------··---
- 12  -
In addition to  being told that  we  spend  endless 
sums  of  money  on  our farmers,  that  we  thereby  encourage 
vast  surpluses  and  then take  other people's market  shares 
by unfair means,  we  are also  told that,  unlike  the  U.S. 
we  make  no  attemptwhatsoever to adjust  to  changed  market 
conditions. 
I  have  already answered  the first three  charges. 
Let  us  now  examine  the fourth  - that  we  let others bear 
the burden of  adjustment whilst  we  stand  on  the  bridge 
and  merrily  signal full  speed  ahead  to the  engine  room. 
~e will restrict our  examination to  wheat. 
I  mentioned  earlier the  much greater incre2.se that 
there  had  been in U.S.  wheat  production than in European. 
But  what  is also  overlooked when  we  are  admonished  on 
this is that,  in the light  of  a  difficult v1orH(  market 
situation,  we  undertook not  to  incree,se  our  share  of 
world  trade but  freeze  our  shl:re  of  the world  wheat  and 
wheat  flour market  in 1982/83  at  the  level  of  the  previous 
year  and  to  increase  our  carry  over  stocks  by  over  70~. 
We  held  to  both these undertakings. 
Another question  I  have  frequently  been asked  since 
I've been here in the  United States is- O.K.  you've 
made  some  effort to  build your  stocks  but  why  don't  you 
have  a  PIX :p:rogra.mme  for wheat  in Europe?  I  would  just 
like to  make  the following  observations.  (Even if we 
12.  ~·o ~ 
could afford it): 
We  do  not  have  enough agricultural land  in Europe 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . - 13  -
our  2"verage  farm size is  only  45  acres 
and  last,  the  29%  increase  in wheat  production 
that has  taken place  in the  Community  has  been  &chieved 
on  an  acreage  that has  remained virtually unchanged for 
ten to fifteen years  whereas  the  increase here  has  been 
achieved  on  a  vastly  expanded  surface.  Thus  a  PIK 
programme  for us  would  mean  reducing acreages  which 
obtained  over  ten years  ago. 
This  does  not all mean,  of  course,  that  everything 
- IC:..t_  V'S ~  e:-c 
is fine  and  we  have  no  uroblems.  We  are  both~hasically 
faced  with the  same  problem  - that  of  producing larger 
quantities  than markets  can absorb. 
In response  to  this  situation and  to  the fact  that 
our  cash is running  out  - unlike  national  govGrnments 
we  are forbidden  to  run deficitis in the  EC  - the  CJmmission 
has  recently  proposed  a  tough  and  \Vide  r:1nging  package 
of  megsures  affecting all our f8rmers. 
3riefly,  these  include: 
through production quotas  - with  severe  penalties 
for  exceeding  them  - and  through guaranteed 
thresholds  a  restriction will  be  nut  on  the 
quantities  on  which farmers  can  enjoy guaranteed 
prices. 
a  restrictive urice  policy will  be  followed 
prices to  be  fixed  for  more  than  one  year for 
some  products  and  an accelerated  move  made 
towards  the  prices  of  our  competitors. - 14  -
This  brings  me  to  the  external  aspects  of  the 
package.  Since  our  own  farmers  are  being asked  to  make 
considerable sacrifices  and  to limit their production, 
the  Commission feels  that it is not  unreasonable  to 
review the  treatment  of  competing  imports  provided  that 
this is done  strictly in accordance  with international 
trading rules. 
The  EC  cannot  ask its farmers  to  limit its own 
grain production without  stabilising imports  of grain 
substitutes.  This  is why  we  are  proposing  to  stabilise 
the  imports  of  corn gluten feed,  for  example,  not  to 
ban  or  to  reduce  them but  to  stabilise them after full 
discussion with  our major  supplier  - the  U.S. 
Furtherrrore,  it seems  to  me  that if we  can 
successfully stabilise our  imports  of grain substitutes, 
then the  amount  of wheat  which  would  be  forced  onto 
world  markets  because it had  been displaced  by  substitutes 
in animal  feeding,  would  be  reduced.  A  factor which 
should  not  be  contrary to  the interests  of  those 
represented here  today. 
The  proposals  I  have  just very briefly described, 
and  which are at this  moment  being  examined  in Athens at 
the  European  Summit  meeting,  are not  an attempt  to  shuffle  ,rff 
our  problems ~  on  to  others  but  a  serious  and  honest 
effort to  adapt  our farm  policy to  meet  the  changed 
conditions  of  the  mid  80's.  As  a  result,  the  CAP  will 
be  enabled  to  continue  to  ensure ~  food  supply  and 
price stability,  to give  our farmers  a  reasonable
1but not 
excessive,return and  yet  permit  us  to  play  a  positive 
and  responsible role in world  trade. 